



Building the Bionic Cloud

- Facts and Visions -

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Co-Chair, NIST Cloud Security WG

Co-Chair, NIST Cloud Forensics Science WG

Stats:

Stats courtesy of
Dr. David Bray, CIO, FCC

- in 2013 - 850 million web servers online
- for 7.1 billion humans that lived on Earth
- by 2022, 75-300 billion networked devices for 8 billion humans that will live on Earth

Every minute on the Internet:

204,000,000+ emails sent globally (2014)

4,000,000+ Google search queries

2,460,000+ pieces of Facebook content shared

72+ hours of new YouTube video uploaded

48,000+ iOS apps downloaded (per Domo.com)

Stats will grow exponentially in the years ahead

2015 Identity Theft Stats: 707.5M Data Records lost or stolen

2015/2016 Increase of Government Breaches:

- OPM (23M);
- IRS (464K eFile PINs);
- US Voters Database (191M records)
- DoJ hack exposed 10K DHS and 20K FBI employees names, emails, job descriptions (1K intelligence analysts)


2016 Increase in Ransomware – Fully functional variant targeting OSX (Mac). It spreads through poisoned adds on major sites

Stats courtesy of Federal Bureau of Investigation- NIST's IT Security Day

Vint Cerf on the Security and Privacy of IoT

“You could have a situation where Bank of America succumbs to a DDoS attack from 100 million connected refrigerators in the U.S.,”

- Cerf said ...




VINT CERF's POINT: The “processing power available for making those things accessible” is enough to make them plausible soldiers in a malicious bot army, once they have been successfully attacked.



Cyber Attacks in Real Time

Cyber Threats (real-time map) - <http://map.norsecorp.com>



NORSE

Ready, 1099 x 575

ATTACK ORIGINS		ATTACK TYPES		ATTACK TARGETS		LIVE ATTACKS						
#	COUNTRY	#	PORT SERVICE TYPE	#	COUNTRY	TIMESTAMP	ATTACKER	ATTACKER IP	ATTACKER ...	TARGET GEO	ATTACK TYPE	PORT
449	 China	428	23  telnet	1022	 United States	11:17:43.727	Chinanet Fujian Province Network	120.33.10...	Fuzhou, CN	Lynnwood...	xsan-filesyst...	50...
311	 South Korea	85	508...  xsan-filesyste...	299	 United Arab ...	11:17:43.618	Network For Pppoe Clients Termi...	109.184.1...	Nizhny No...	Lynnwood...	microsoft-ds	445
220	 United States	69	508...  xsan-filesyste...	39	 Germany	11:17:43.190	Hknet Company Ltd.	202.67.23...	Hong Kon...	Kirksville, ...	ssh	22
80	 Germany	68	5900  rfb	24	 Portugal	11:17:43.179	Starnet Iir	185.93.18...	Kharkiv UA	Brapa PT	telnet	23



<https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/>



2603027

2215688

283944

60852

161966

31292

2363114

37



OAS



ODS



WAV



MAV



IDS



VUL



KAS



BAD


CYBERTHREAT REAL-TIME MAP




EN


[Download Trial](#)[MAP](#)[STATISTICS](#)[DATA SOURCES](#)[BUZZ](#)[WIDGET](#)[Share](#)

The Evolution of the Internet is @ a 3-Factor Inflection Point



The Backbone of the IoT – the Cloud





Mission Impossible 1

We offer three kinds of service:
GOOD - CHEAP - FAST
You can pick any two
GOOD service CHEAP won't be FAST
GOOD service FAST won't be CHEAP
FAST service CHEAP won't be GOOD

NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture

NIST SP 500-299 (draft reviewed by public)





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NIST CC Security Reference Architecture – the Approach

NIST Security Reference Architecture – formal model



NIST Security Reference Architecture – security components


				Risk Index System			
				C	I	A	CIA
3	EO 13526	Compliance	Intellectual Property	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00
4	EO 13526	Data Governance	Handling Labeling Security	3.00	2.00	1.00	6.00
5	EO 13526	Data Governance	User Data Policy	1.00	0.00	1.00	2.00
6	EO 13526	Data Governance	Rules for Information	2.00	3.00	2.00	7.00
7	EO 13526	Human Resource Security	Employee Awareness	2.00	3.00	2.00	7.00
8	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Market Threat Intelligence	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
9	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Knowledge Base	1.00	2.00	2.00	5.00
10	EO 13526	Compliance	Audit Planning	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
11	EO 13526	Compliance	Internal Audits	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
12	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Event Mining	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
13	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Event Correlation	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
14	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Email Journaling	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
15	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	User Behaviors and Profile	3.00	2.00	2.00	7.00
16	EO 13526	Legal Services	Discovery	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
17	EO 13526	Legal Services	Incident Response Legal	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
18	EO 13526	Internal Investigations	Forensic Analysis	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
19	EO 13526	Internal Investigations	e-Mail Journaling	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.00
20	EO 13526	Compliance	Independent Audits	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
21	EO 13526	Compliance	Third Party Audits	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
22	EO 13526	Operational Risk Management	Business Impact Analysis	3.00	2.00	2.00	7.00
23	EO 13526	Operational Risk Management	Business Continuity	3.00	2.00	2.00	7.00
24	EO 13526	Operational Risk Management	Crisis Management	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.00
25	EO 13526	Operational Risk Management	Risk Management	1.00	2.00	2.00	5.00
26	EO 13526	Operational Risk Management	Independent Risk	1.00	2.00	2.00	5.00
27	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Database Monitoring	2.00	3.00	3.00	9.00
28	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Application Monitoring	2.00	3.00	3.00	9.00
29	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	End Point Monitoring	2.00	3.00	3.00	9.00
30	EO 13526	Security Monitoring Services	Cloud Monitoring	2.00	3.00	3.00	9.00
31	EO 13526	Data Governance	Secure Disposal of Data	3.00	3.00	3.00	9.00

Mapping components to architecture

NIST Reference Architecture




CSA's TCI Reference Architecture



+

NIST Security Reference Architecture (NIST SP 500-299)


- the Formal Model -



Cloud Security Alliance's TCI Reference Architecture

- NCC SWG leverages on Cloud Security Alliance's Trusted Cloud Initiative - Reference Architecture

<https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/TCI-Reference-Architecture-1.1.pdf>



– security components -

Forme cloud ecosystem reengineering																					
	A	B	C	D	E	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
1																					
2	Components descriptions available on CSA's interactive site: https://research.cloudsecurityalliance.org/tc/etxplorer/						Consumer			Provider			Broker			Carrier		Auditor			
3							laaS	PaaS	SaaS		laaS	PaaS	SaaS		laaS	PaaS	SaaS		ALL	ALL	
37	BOSS	Human Resource	Roles and Responsibilities		PS		X	X	X		X	X	X		B	B	B		A	A	
38	BOSS	Human Resource	Employee Code of Conduct		PS		X	X	X		X	X	X		B	B	B		X	A	
39	BOSS	Compliance	Information Systems Regulatory		RA		A	A	A		X	X*	X*		B	B	B		A	A	
40	BOSS	Data Governance	Data Ownership - Personnel		RA		X	X	X		A	X*	X*		A	A	A		A	A	
41	BOSS	Data Governance	Data Classification		RA		X	X	X		X	X*	X*		A	A	A		A	A	
42	BOSS	Security Monitoring	Managed (Outsourced) Security		SA		X	X	X		A	X	X		B	B	B		A		
43	BOSS	Legal Services	Contracts		SA		X	X	X		X	X*	X*		A	A	A		X	A	
44	BOSS	Security Monitoring	Honey Pot		SC		A	A				A	A						A		
45	BOSS	Security Monitoring	Real Time Internetwork Defense		SC		A	A	A		X	X	X		B	B	B		A		
46	BOSS	Data Governance	Rules for Data Retention		SI		A	A	A		X	X*	X*		B	B	B		A	A	
47	BOSS	Security Monitoring	SIEM Platform		SI		X	X	A		A	X	X		B	B	B		A	A	
48	BOSS	Security Monitoring	Anti Phishing		SI		A	A	A		A	A	A		B	B	B		X		
Actors Analysis validated																					
Actors Analysis reorg																					
CC Ecosystem validated																					
CC E																					

[illegible]


NIST Security Reference Architecture (NIST SP 500-299)

– Heat Map of the Aggregated-CIA Security Indexes –

Business Operation Support Services (BOSS)



Information Technology Operation & Support (ITOS)



Security and Risk Management



Security and Privacy Controls for Cloud-based Federal Information Systems.

NIST SP 800-174
-work in progress -




Security and Privacy Controls for Cloud-based Federal Information Systems

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NIST Cloud Security Rubik's Cube (CSRC)


- CSRC is a tool that helps orchestrating a cloud ecosystem and analyzes the data aggregated in this process.
- The tool was implemented by NIST's summer 2015 SURF interns.





Mission Impossible 2

TOM CRUISE
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE 2



Visibility & Trust



BUILD TRUST

The notion of “perimeter” becomes obsolete.
The old walls and moats can no longer defend us.


Dealing with an Iceberg Architecture

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce


[SP 500-299](#)

NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture

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Category	Control	Control ID	Control Description	Control Type	Control Status	Control Owner	Control Review	Control Evidence	Control Impact
Security	1.1.1	1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1	1.1.1.1.1
	1.1.2	1.1.2.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1	1.1.2.1.1
	1.1.3	1.1.3.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1	1.1.3.1.1
	1.1.4	1.1.4.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1	1.1.4.1.1
	1.1.5	1.1.5.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1	1.1.5.1.1
	1.1.6	1.1.6.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1	1.1.6.1.1
	1.1.7	1.1.7.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1	1.1.7.1.1
	1.1.8	1.1.8.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1	1.1.8.1.1
	1.1.9	1.1.9.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1	1.1.9.1.1
	1.1.10	1.1.10.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1	1.1.10.1.1




Risk Management Framework (SP 800-37)

- Step 1: **Categorize** Information System
- Step 2: **Select** Security Controls
- Step 3: **Implement** Security Controls
- Step 4: **Assess** Security Controls
- Step 5: **Authorize** Information System
- Step 6: **Monitor** Security Controls
(Repeat process as necessary)

Risk Management Framework in Cloud Env. (SP 800-115)

- Step 1: **Categorize** Federal Information System
- Step 2: **Select** Security Controls (Identify Security Requirements, perform a Risk Assessment)
- Step 3: **Implement**
- Step 4: **Assess** Service Provider(s) & Controls
- Step 5: **Authorize** Use of Service
- Step 6: **Monitor** Service Provider (on-going, near-real-time);
(Repeat process as necessary)

NIST SP 800-173:
Guide for Applying Risk Management Framework
to Cloud-based Federal Information Systems




Stack - image source: Cloud Security Alliance
specification, 2009

Guide to Applying Risk Management Framework to Cloud-based Federal Information Systems.


NIST SP 800-173
-draft-



NIST SP 800-37 Rev1: Risk Management Framework (RMF)



NIST SP 800-173: *RMF for the Cloud Ecosystem (RMF4CE)*



RMF for Cloud Ecosystem

Layers Managed
by Consumer

Layers Managed
by Provider

Consumer's
RMF4CE

Consumer's
RMF

Provider's
RMF

AUTHORIZE

Risk
ASSESS

MONITOR

Risk
control

CATEGORIZE


Risk
assessment

SELECT

IMPLEMENT

FedRAMP applies
RMF when A&A
Cloud Providers

Consumer's
RMF4CE



**“Industry should steal
FedRAMP cloud
security baselines”**

“You need good security requirements around procuring cloud? Look what FedRAMP's done. Not some industry-driven consortium.”

John Pescatore, Director SANS @ CyberCon




Pescatore, speaking at the [Federal Times' CyberCon](#) conference on Nov. 18, cited this as an area where the government has solved a problem that the private sector can take advantage of.

“For example, the GSA FedRAMP program for cloud — at Gartner, I found myself pointing private industry customers toward that,” he said. “You need good security requirements around procuring cloud? Look what FedRAMP's done. Not some industry-driven consortium.”


Guide to Applying Risk Management Framework to Cloud-based Federal Information Systems

✓ Cloud Ecosystem Boundaries




Guide to Applying Risk Management Framework to Cloud-based Federal Information Systems –cont.

Building Trust & Trust Boundary





Mission Impossible 3



Structured Formats

I, the sender, want to send a letter to
Addressee .



Here is my stamp

They live at the house with Street Number on
First Street in Some City.


In case you are unable to deliver please return
the letter to Street Address in City and State.

Sender
Street Address
City, State ZIP



Addressee
Street Address
City, State ZIP
|||||||

Transforming Automation Dream into Reality



Transforming Automation Dream into Reality

- cont.

Components descriptions also available on CSA's interactive site found at: https://research.cloudsecurityalliance.org/tci/						Capability Implementation SP800-53 Rev4		
DOMAIN	CONTAINER	CAPABILITY (process or solution)	CAPABILITY (process or solution)	SCOPE	IF CAPABILITIES mapping	Reviewed Low(Capability implementation)	Reviewed Moderate(Capability implementation)	Reviewed High(Capability implementation)
BOSS	Compliance	Intellectual Property Protection				AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-	AC-2(11), AC-2(13), AC-
BOSS	Data Governance	Handling/ Labeling/ Security		TIC	TM.DS.05	AC-1, AC-3, AC-4, AT-1,	MP-3, MP-5, MP-5(4)	AC-16
BOSS	Data Governance	Clear Desk Policy				MP-1, MP-2, MP-7	MP-4, MP-5, MP-5(4),	
BOSS	Data Governance	Rules for Information Leakage		TIC	TM.LOG.04;	AC-1, CP-1, IA-1, IR-1,		
BOSS	Human Resource Security	Employee Awareness			TO.MG.10	AT-1, AT-2, AR-5	AT-2(2)	
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Market Threat Intelligence		TIC	TS.INS.01;	AU-6, CA-2, IR-4, IR-5	AU-6(1), AU-6(3), CA-	AU-6(5), AU-6(6), IR-
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Knowledge Base		TIC	TM.DS.05;	PL-2, SA-5	PL-7, PL-8	
BOSS	Compliance	Audit Planning		CoMo		CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-7,	CA-2(2), CA-7(1), PL-	PL-8(1), PL-8(2)
BOSS	Compliance	Internal Audit		CoMo; TIC	TO.MON.03	CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-7,	CA-2(2), CA-7(1), CA-8,	CA-7(3)
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Event Mitigation		CoMo; TIC	TM.DS.01;	AU-6, CA-7, RA-5, SI-	AU-6(3), RA-5(6), RA-	AU-6(4), CA-7(3), SI-
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Event Correlation		CoMo; TIC	TM.DS.01	AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, RA-5,	AU-6(3), SI-4(16)	AU-6(6), AU-6(9), IR-
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Email Journaling		CoMo; TIC	TS.CF.05; TS.CF.06;	SI-3, SI-4	SI-3(7), SI-4(5)	SI-4(10), SI-4(12)
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	User Behaviors and Profile		CoMo		AC-2, AU-1, AU-2, AU-	AC-2(12),	AU-6(8)
BOSS	Legal Services	E-Discovery		TIC	TM.DS.01	AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-	AU-3(1), AU-7, AU-7(1),	AU-3(2), AU-9(3), AU-
BOSS	Legal Services	Incident Response Legal		TIC	TM.DS.01;	AU-1, IR-1	AU-10, AU-10(1), AU-	AU-10(1), AU-
BOSS	Internal Investigations	Forensic Analysis		TIC	TM.DS.01	AU-6, IR-5, IR-7	AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-7,	AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-
BOSS	Internal Investigations	e-Mail Journaling		TIC	TM.LOG.04	AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-	AU-3(1), AU-7, AU-7(1),	AU-9(2), AU-9(3), AU-
BOSS	Compliance	Independent Audits		CoMo		CA-1, CA-2, CA-2(1),	CA-2(2), CA-7(1), CA-8,	CA-7(3), SA-11(3)
BOSS	Compliance	Third Party's Compliance		CoMo		AC-20, CA-3, PS-7, SA-	AC-20(1), SA-9(1), SA-	
BOSS	Operational Risk Management	Business Impact Analysis		TIC	TM.PC.04;	CM-4, CP-2, RA-1, RA-	CM-3, CM-9, CP-2(3),	CP-2(4), CP-2(5), SA-
BOSS	Operational Risk Management	Business Continuity	Planning & Testing	TIC	TO.MG.04;	CP-1, CP-2, CP-3, CP-	CP-2(1), CP-2(3), CP-	CP-2(2), CP-2(4), CP-
BOSS	Operational Risk Management	Crisis Management		TIC	TO.MG.04;	CP-1, CP-2, CP-3, CP-	CP-2(1), CP-2(3),	CP-3(1), CP-10(4), IR-
BOSS	Operational Risk Management	Risk Management Framework	Business & Technical	TIC	TO.MON.02	RA-3		SA-14
BOSS	Operational Risk Management	Independent Risk Management		TIC	TO.MON.02	CA-2, CA-7, RA-3	CA-2(1), CA-7(1)	CA-8, CA-8(1)
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Database Monitoring		CoMo		AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-	AU-2(3), AU-3(1), AU-	AU-12(1), AU-3(2), AU-
BOSS	Security Monitoring Services	Application Monitoring		CoMo; TIC	TO.MON.04	AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-	AU-2(3), AU-3(1), AU-	AU-12(1), AU-3(2), AU-

Format of a Structured Security Control

- Hierarchical
- Standards-based (e.g. NIST SP 800-53, ISO 27001/2)
 - Description and Metadata:
 - Overlay ->Technology (Cloud, ICS, Mobile, etc...)
 - ❖ Scope (functional capability)
 - » Implementation
 - » Assessment
 - » Metrics
 - » Other related information

Open Security Controls Automation Language (OSCAL)

- OSCAL aims to provide a structured representation of the security controls for Overlays that would:
 - Allow Consumers to compare cloud services from different Providers
 - Speed up FedRAMP's assessment process
 - Support security SLA & metrics
 - Make possible the automation of continuous monitoring

Questions?



For additional information :



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THANK YOU!